The authors examine several possible scenarios for the coming years. They find that in the absence of growing government deficits, maintaining growth would require a continued spiral of debt-financed consumer spending. Since the authors consider such a trend unsustainable, they calculate the impact of the almost inevitable retrenchment in consumption. Without a compensating infusion of spending from either the foreign or government sectors, they demonstrate that the economy would enter a prolonged, deep recession. Growth would average 1 percent from 2002 to 2006 and the unemployment rate would rise to 8 percent by the end of that period.
Clearly this scenario is unacceptable to policymakers and the public. The government would probably react to a recession by dramatically easing its fiscal stance. (The administration has already staved off the worst outcome with its recent tax cuts.) How much fiscal stimulus would be needed to maintain a reasonable rate of growth in the face of a dropoff in private borrowing? The authors calculate that the total deficit of the public sector would have to rise to 8 percent of gross domestic product just to meet existing Congressional Budget Office growth forecasts.
Many policymakers would find this scenario unpalatable and perhaps just as unsustainable as the current buildup of private sector debt. The only alternative, the authors argue, is an improvement in the current account deficit, which now stands at near record levels. Effecting a turnaround in the current account without a decline in the value of the dollar (or depreciation) may be difficult, however. A lower dollar would raise the price of imports (in dollars) and make U.S. goods less expensive abroad. A depreciation of about 25 percent would probably be necessary. A longexpected fall in the value of the dollar has only begun to materialize, however, and a reduction in U.S. imports would imperil economies around the world that count on income from exports to the United States. A policy of weakening the dollar would therefore have to be combined with stimulative measures, such as increased government spending, not just in the United States, but also in its trading partners.
If policymakers brought the current account under control, the government deficit and private sector balances could be returned to sustainable levels within about five years. This objective may be difficult to achieve, say the authors, but there is no acceptable alternative.
New Policy Note
The investments for the future, such as research on environmentally sound technologies. Any tax cuts should be aimed at a broad swath of low-income and middle-class workers, who are more likely to pour any windfall back into the economy than wealthy investors.
Policymakers should also bear in mind the danger of a collapse of the dollar, which would be the likely outcome of a decision by foreign investors to stop financing the yawning U.S. current account deficit. This threat only heightens the need for economic stimulus and the cost of directing new resources where they are needed least. 
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Part of the explanation for the difference, writes
Hungerford, lies in the way social security is indexed for inflation in the two nations. American Social Security recipients are given a cost-of-living adjustment each year, based upon that year's rate of inflation. German pension benefits are indexed in a different way, one that actually increases the purchasing power of benefit checks over time. This difference is important: people often exhaust their savings before they die, and the value of non-social security income is diminished by inflation. Since older Americans tend to rely more heavily on these dwindling private income sources, they tend to lose ground over time.
Hungerford concludes that U.S. citizens and Germans do have distinctive "ways of aging." He points out that future reforms of the social security systems in each country may alter the situation further, causing patterns of income receipt to diverge further or become more alike. in their 40s were still or again poor by old age; only 7 percent or so of those who avoided chronic poverty in middle age were poor when they were 66. Even more striking is that individuals with very low income in middle age had a 20
Why the Tobin Tax Can Be Stabilizing
percentage-point greater chance of dying before age 66 than others. Every measure of middle-aged hardship had a strong effect on the probability of most old-age hardships that Hungerford studied.
Once again, an important point is that relatively rosy statistics on the elderly conceal dramatic differences in wellbeing between different subgroups. For example, blacks who were poor in their 40s had a 39 percentage-point greater chance than blacks who were not poor in their 40s of being in poverty at age 66; for whites, the corresponding figure is 27 percentage points. Moreover, for women more often than men, poverty or near poverty in old age was foreshadowed in middle age.
The fact that those who experience hardship in old age tend to have previous experiences of deprivation does not necessarily imply a causal link, writes Hungerford. Some overlooked factor might tend to cause poverty in both the old and the middle-aged. He was able to rule out that possibility in most cases, however, by comparing individuals of the same race and educational background, among other factors. 
